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docs(security): document sessions_spawn sandbox=require hardening

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Peter Steinberger
2026-03-02 01:29:13 +00:00
parent f53ea0b74b
commit f8459ef46c
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8
SECURITY.md
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@@ -206,6 +206,14 @@ For threat model + hardening guidance (including `openclaw security audit --deep
- `tools.fs.workspaceOnly: true` (optional): restricts `read`/`write`/`edit`/`apply_patch` paths and native prompt image auto-load paths to the workspace directory.
- Avoid setting `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` unless you fully trust who can trigger tool execution.
### Sub-agent delegation hardening
- Keep `sessions_spawn` denied unless you explicitly need delegated runs.
- Keep `agents.list[].subagents.allowAgents` narrow, and only include agents with sandbox settings you trust.
- When delegation must stay sandboxed, call `sessions_spawn` with `sandbox: "require"` (default is `inherit`).
- `sandbox: "require"` rejects the spawn unless the target child runtime is sandboxed.
- This prevents a less-restricted session from delegating work into an unsandboxed child by mistake.
### Web Interface Safety
OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for **local use only**.

9
docs/gateway/security/index.md
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@@ -898,6 +898,15 @@ Also consider agent workspace access inside the sandbox:
Important: `tools.elevated` is the global baseline escape hatch that runs exec on the host. Keep `tools.elevated.allowFrom` tight and don’t enable it for strangers. You can further restrict elevated per agent via `agents.list[].tools.elevated`. See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
### Sub-agent delegation guardrail
If you allow session tools, treat delegated sub-agent runs as another boundary decision:
- Deny `sessions_spawn` unless the agent truly needs delegation.
- Keep `agents.list[].subagents.allowAgents` restricted to known-safe target agents.
- For any workflow that must remain sandboxed, call `sessions_spawn` with `sandbox: "require"` (default is `inherit`).
- `sandbox: "require"` fails fast when the target child runtime is not sandboxed.
## Browser control risks
Enabling browser control gives the model the ability to drive a real browser.