fix: harden sandbox fs dash-path regression coverage (#25891) (thanks @albertlieyingadrian)

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Discord/Voice reliability: restore runtime DAVE dependency (`@snazzah/davey`), add configurable DAVE join options (`channels.discord.voice.daveEncryption` and `channels.discord.voice.decryptionFailureTolerance`), clean up voice listeners/session teardown, guard against stale connection events, and trigger controlled rejoin recovery after repeated decrypt failures to improve inbound STT stability under DAVE receive errors. (#25861, #25372, #24883, #24825, #23890, #23105, #22961, #23421, #23278, #23032)
 - Matrix/Read receipts: send read receipts as soon as Matrix messages arrive (before handler pipeline work), so clients no longer show long-lived unread/sent states while replies are processing. (#25841, #25840) Thanks @joshjhall.
 - Sandbox/FS bridge: build canonical-path shell scripts with newline separators (not `; ` joins) to avoid POSIX `sh` `do;` syntax errors that broke sandbox file/image read-write operations. (#25737, #25824, #25868) Thanks @DennisGoldfinger and @peteragility.
+- Sandbox/FS bridge tests: add regression coverage for dash-leading basenames to confirm sandbox file reads resolve to absolute container paths (and avoid shell-option misdiagnosis for dashed filenames). (#25891) Thanks @albertlieyingadrian.
 - Routing/Session isolation: harden followup routing so explicit cross-channel origin replies never fall back to the active dispatcher on route failure, preserve queued overflow summary routing metadata (`channel`/`to`/`thread`) across followup drain, and prefer originating channel context over internal provider tags for embedded followup runs. This prevents webchat/control-ui context from hijacking Discord-targeted replies in shared sessions. (#25864) Thanks @Gamedesigner.
 - Messaging tool dedupe: treat originating channel metadata as authoritative for same-target `message.send` suppression in proactive runs (heartbeat/cron/exec-event), including synthetic-provider contexts, so `delivery-mirror` transcript entries no longer cause duplicate Telegram sends. (#25835) Thanks @jadeathena84-arch.
 - Cron/Heartbeat delivery: stop inheriting cached session `lastThreadId` for heartbeat-mode target resolution unless a thread/topic is explicitly requested, so announce-mode cron and heartbeat deliveries stay on top-level destinations instead of leaking into active conversation threads. (#25730) Thanks @markshields-tl.

src/agents/sandbox/fs-bridge.test.ts

@@ -123,6 +123,17 @@ describe("sandbox fs bridge shell compatibility", () => {
     expect(readPath).toContain("file_1095---");
   });
 
+  it("resolves dash-leading basenames into absolute container paths", async () => {
+    const bridge = createSandboxFsBridge({ sandbox: createSandbox() });
+
+    await bridge.readFile({ filePath: "--leading.txt" });
+
+    const readCall = findCallByScriptFragment('cat -- "$1"');
+    expect(readCall).toBeDefined();
+    const readPath = readCall ? getDockerPathArg(readCall[0]) : "";
+    expect(readPath).toBe("/workspace/--leading.txt");
+  });
+
   it("resolves bind-mounted absolute container paths for reads", async () => {
     const sandbox = createSandbox({
       docker: {

src/agents/sandbox/fs-bridge.ts

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
     const target = this.resolveResolvedPath(params);
     await this.assertPathSafety(target, { action: "read files" });
     const result = await this.runCommand('set -eu; cat -- "$1"', {
-      args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(target.containerPath)],
+      args: [target.containerPath],
       signal: params.signal,
     });
     return result.stdout;
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
         ? 'set -eu; cat >"$1"'
         : 'set -eu; dir=$(dirname -- "$1"); if [ "$dir" != "." ]; then mkdir -p -- "$dir"; fi; cat >"$1"';
     await this.runCommand(script, {
-      args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(target.containerPath)],
+      args: [target.containerPath],
       stdin: buffer,
       signal: params.signal,
     });
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
     this.ensureWriteAccess(target, "create directories");
     await this.assertPathSafety(target, { action: "create directories", requireWritable: true });
     await this.runCommand('set -eu; mkdir -p -- "$1"', {
-      args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(target.containerPath)],
+      args: [target.containerPath],
       signal: params.signal,
     });
   }
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
     );
     const rmCommand = flags.length > 0 ? `rm ${flags.join(" ")}` : "rm";
     await this.runCommand(`set -eu; ${rmCommand} -- "$1"`, {
-      args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(target.containerPath)],
+      args: [target.containerPath],
       signal: params.signal,
     });
   }
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
     await this.runCommand(
       'set -eu; dir=$(dirname -- "$2"); if [ "$dir" != "." ]; then mkdir -p -- "$dir"; fi; mv -- "$1" "$2"',
       {
-        args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(from.containerPath), ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(to.containerPath)],
+        args: [from.containerPath, to.containerPath],
         signal: params.signal,
       },
     );
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
     const target = this.resolveResolvedPath(params);
     await this.assertPathSafety(target, { action: "stat files" });
     const result = await this.runCommand('set -eu; stat -c "%F|%s|%Y" -- "$1"', {
-      args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(target.containerPath)],
+      args: [target.containerPath],
       signal: params.signal,
       allowFailure: true,
     });
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
       'printf "%s%s\\n" "$canonical" "$suffix"',
     ].join("\n");
     const result = await this.runCommand(script, {
-      args: [ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(params.containerPath), params.allowFinalSymlink ? "1" : "0"],
+      args: [params.containerPath, params.allowFinalSymlink ? "1" : "0"],
     });
     const canonical = result.stdout.toString("utf8").trim();
     if (!canonical.startsWith("/")) {
@@ -363,19 +363,6 @@ function isPathInsidePosix(root: string, target: string): boolean {
   return target === root || target.startsWith(`${root}/`);
 }
 
-/**
- * Ensure the path is not interpreted as a shell option.
- * Paths starting with "-" can be interpreted as command options by the shell.
- * Prepend "./" to prevent this interpretation.
- */
-function ensurePathNotInterpretedAsOption(path: string): string {
-  // If path starts with a hyphen (either - or --), prepend ./ to prevent interpretation as option
-  if (path.startsWith("-") || path.startsWith("--")) {
-    return "./" + path;
-  }
-  return path;
-}
-
 async function assertNoHostSymlinkEscape(params: {
   absolutePath: string;
   rootPath: string;