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docs: fix Moltbot naming in security + formal verification pages

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vignesh07
2026-01-27 15:15:18 -08:00
parent 8198e826da
commit 98b136541b
2 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
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4
docs/gateway/security/index.md
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ It flags common footguns (Gateway auth exposure, browser control exposure, eleva
Running an AI agent with shell access on your machine is... *spicy*. Here’s how to not get pwned.
Clawdbot is both a product and an experiment: you’re wiring frontier-model behavior into real messaging surfaces and real tools. **There is no “perfectly secure” setup.** The goal is to be deliberate about:
Moltbot is both a product and an experiment: you’re wiring frontier-model behavior into real messaging surfaces and real tools. **There is no “perfectly secure” setup.** The goal is to be deliberate about:
- who can talk to your bot
- where the bot is allowed to act
- what the bot can touch
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ Mario asking for find ~
## Reporting Security Issues
Found a vulnerability in Clawdbot? Please report responsibly:
Found a vulnerability in Moltbot? Please report responsibly:
1. Email: security@clawd.bot
2. Don't post publicly until fixed

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docs/security/formal-verification.md
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ This page tracks Moltbot’s **formal security models** (TLA+/TLC today; more as
> Moltbot was formerly named Clawdbot; some older references and commands may still use `clawdbot`.
**Goal (north star):** provide a machine-checked argument that Clawdbot enforces its
**Goal (north star):** provide a machine-checked argument that Moltbot enforces its
intended security policy (authorization, session isolation, tool gating, and
misconfiguration safety), under explicit assumptions.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ misconfiguration safety), under explicit assumptions.
- Each claim has a runnable model-check over a finite state space.
- Many claims have a paired **negative model** that produces a counterexample trace for a realistic bug class.
**What this is not (yet):** a proof that “Clawdbot is secure in all respects” or that the full TypeScript implementation is correct.
**What this is not (yet):** a proof that “Moltbot is secure in all respects” or that the full TypeScript implementation is correct.
## Where the models live