docs: clarify intentional network-visible canvas model in security policy

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-19 14:25:34 +01:00
parent fec48a5006
commit 808a60d3bd

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@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for *
- Recommended: keep the Gateway **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1` / `::1`).
- Config: `gateway.bind="loopback"` (default).
- CLI: `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`.
- Canvas host note: network-visible canvas is **intentional** for trusted node scenarios (LAN/tailnet).
- Expected setup: non-loopback bind + Gateway auth (token/password/trusted-proxy) + firewall/tailnet controls.
- Expected routes: `/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`.
- This deployment model alone is not a security vulnerability.
- Do **not** expose it to the public internet (no direct bind to `0.0.0.0`, no public reverse proxy). It is not hardened for public exposure.
- If you need remote access, prefer an SSH tunnel or Tailscale serve/funnel (so the Gateway still binds to loopback), plus strong Gateway auth.
- The Gateway HTTP surface includes the canvas host (`/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`). Treat canvas content as sensitive/untrusted and avoid exposing it beyond loopback unless you understand the risk.