docs(security): clarify trusted-config dos scope

SECURITY.md

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ These are frequently reported but are typically closed with no code change:
 - Prompt-injection-only chains without a boundary bypass (prompt injection is out of scope).
 - Operator-intended local features (for example TUI local `!` shell) presented as remote injection.
 - Reports that assume per-user multi-tenant authorization on a shared gateway host/config.
+- ReDoS/DoS claims that require trusted operator configuration input (for example catastrophic regex in `sessionFilter` or `logging.redactPatterns`) without a trust-boundary bypass.
 - Missing HSTS findings on default local/loopback deployments.
 - Slack webhook signature findings when HTTP mode already uses signing-secret verification.
 - Discord inbound webhook signature findings for paths not used by this repo's Discord integration.
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ When patching a GHSA via `gh api`, include `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` (o
 - Deployments where mutually untrusted/adversarial operators share one gateway host and config
 - Prompt injection attacks
 - Reports that require write access to trusted local state (`~/.openclaw`, workspace files like `MEMORY.md` / `memory/*.md`)
+- Reports that depend on trusted operator-supplied configuration values to trigger availability impact (for example custom regex patterns). These may still be fixed as defense-in-depth hardening, but are not security-boundary bypasses.
 
 ## Deployment Assumptions