docs(changelog): note security audit and slack download scope hardening

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-03-02 02:23:17 +00:00
parent 40fda40aa7
commit 00d2df46c7

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@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Gateway/Control UI origins: support wildcard `"*"` in `gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins` for trusted remote access setups. Landed from contributor PR #31088 by @frankekn. Thanks @frankekn.
- Cron/Isolated CLI timeout ratio: avoid reusing persisted CLI session IDs on fresh isolated cron runs so the fresh watchdog profile is used and jobs do not abort at roughly one-third of configured `timeoutSeconds`. (#30140) Thanks @ningding97.
- Cron/Session target guardrail: reject creating or patching `sessionTarget: "main"` cron jobs when `agentId` is not the default agent, preventing invalid cross-agent main-session bindings at write time. (#30217) Thanks @liaosvcaf.
- Security/Audit: flag `gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins=["*"]` as a high-risk configuration (severity based on bind exposure), and add a Feishu doc-tool warning that `owner_open_id` on `feishu_doc` create can grant document permissions.
- Slack/download-file scoping: thread/channel-aware `download-file` actions now propagate optional scope context and reject downloads when Slack metadata definitively shows the file is outside the requested channel/thread, while preserving legacy behavior when share metadata is unavailable.
- Security/Sandbox media reads: eliminate sandbox media TOCTOU symlink-retarget escapes by enforcing root-scoped boundary-safe reads at attachment/image load time and consolidating shared safe-read helpers across sandbox media callsites. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Node host/service auth env: include `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN` in `openclaw node install` service environments (with `CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN` compatibility fallback) so installed node services keep remote gateway token auth across restart/reboot. Fixes #31041. Thanks @OneStepAt4time for reporting, @byungsker, @liuxiaopai-ai, and @vincentkoc.
- Security/Subagents sandbox inheritance: block sandboxed sessions from spawning cross-agent subagents that would run unsandboxed, preventing runtime sandbox downgrade via `sessions_spawn agentId`. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.