diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 8562a232ddb..78a18b606db 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ These are frequently reported but are typically closed with no code change:
 - Reports that only show differences in heuristic detection/parity (for example obfuscation-pattern detection on one exec path but not another, such as `node.invoke -> system.run` parity gaps) without demonstrating bypass of auth, approvals, allowlist enforcement, sandboxing, or other documented trust boundaries.
 - ReDoS/DoS claims that require trusted operator configuration input (for example catastrophic regex in `sessionFilter` or `logging.redactPatterns`) without a trust-boundary bypass.
 - Archive/install extraction claims that require pre-existing local filesystem priming in trusted state (for example planting symlink/hardlink aliases under destination directories such as skills/tools paths) without showing an untrusted path that can create/control that primitive.
+- Reports that depend on replacing or rewriting an already-approved executable path on a trusted host (same-path inode/content swap) without showing an untrusted path to perform that write.
+- Reports that depend on pre-existing symlinked skill/workspace filesystem state (for example symlink chains involving `skills/*/SKILL.md`) without showing an untrusted path that can create/control that state.
 - Missing HSTS findings on default local/loopback deployments.
 - Slack webhook signature findings when HTTP mode already uses signing-secret verification.
 - Discord inbound webhook signature findings for paths not used by this repo's Discord integration.
@@ -114,6 +116,8 @@ Plugins/extensions are part of OpenClaw's trusted computing base for a gateway.
 - Prompt-injection-only attacks (without a policy/auth/sandbox boundary bypass)
 - Reports that require write access to trusted local state (`~/.openclaw`, workspace files like `MEMORY.md` / `memory/*.md`)
 - Reports where exploitability depends on attacker-controlled pre-existing symlink/hardlink filesystem state in trusted local paths (for example extraction/install target trees) unless a separate untrusted boundary bypass is shown that creates that state.
+- Reports whose only claim is sandbox/workspace read expansion through trusted local skill/workspace symlink state (for example `skills/*/SKILL.md` symlink chains) unless a separate untrusted boundary bypass is shown that creates/controls that state.
+- Reports whose only claim is post-approval executable identity drift on a trusted host via same-path file replacement/rewrite unless a separate untrusted boundary bypass is shown for that host write primitive.
 - Reports where the only demonstrated impact is an already-authorized sender intentionally invoking a local-action command (for example `/export-session` writing to an absolute host path) without bypassing auth, sandbox, or another documented boundary
 - Reports where the only claim is that a trusted-installed/enabled plugin can execute with gateway/host privileges (documented trust model behavior).
 - Any report whose only claim is that an operator-enabled `dangerous*`/`dangerously*` config option weakens defaults (these are explicit break-glass tradeoffs by design)