From d0ef4c75c7eb19ae562587c9d0a9afb3beec9560 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Steinberger Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 02:59:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs(changelog): credit safeBins advisory reporters --- CHANGELOG.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 54c30bc75e3..c25761ec4c8 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai - Config/Kilo Gateway: Kilo provider flow now surfaces an updated list of models. (#24921) thanks @gumadeiras. - Security/Sandbox: enforce `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` and `tools.fs.workspaceOnly` for `apply_patch` in sandbox-mounted paths so writes/deletes cannot escape the workspace boundary via mounts like `/agent` unless explicitly opted out (`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false`). This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting. - Security/Config writes: block reserved prototype keys in account-id normalization and route account config resolution through own-key lookups, hardening `/allowlist` and account-scoped config paths against prototype-chain pollution. -- Security/Exec: harden `safeBins` long-option validation by rejecting unknown/ambiguous GNU long-option abbreviations and denying sort filesystem-dependent flags (`--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`), closing safe-bin denylist bypasses. Thanks @jiseoung. +- Security/Exec: harden `safeBins` long-option validation by rejecting unknown/ambiguous GNU long-option abbreviations and denying sort filesystem-dependent flags (`--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`), closing safe-bin denylist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey and @jiseoung for reporting. - Security/Channels: unify dangerous name-matching policy checks (`dangerouslyAllowNameMatching`) across core and extension channels, share mutable-allowlist detectors between `openclaw doctor` and `openclaw security audit`, and scan all configured accounts (not only the default account) in channel security audit findings. - Security/Exec approvals: enforce canonical wrapper execution plans across allowlist analysis and runtime execution (node host + gateway host), fail closed on semantic `env` wrapper usage, and reject unknown short safe-bin flags to prevent `env -S/--split-string` interpretation-mismatch bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting. - Security/Image tool: enforce `tools.fs.workspaceOnly` for sandboxed `image` path resolution so mounted out-of-workspace paths are blocked before media bytes are loaded/sent to vision providers. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.