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fix(gateway): harden browser websocket auth chain
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@@ -2145,8 +2145,9 @@ See [Plugins](/tools/plugin).
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- `auth.allowTailscale`: when `true`, Tailscale Serve identity headers can satisfy Control UI/WebSocket auth (verified via `tailscale whois`); HTTP API endpoints still require token/password auth. This tokenless flow assumes the gateway host is trusted. Defaults to `true` when `tailscale.mode = "serve"`.
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- `auth.rateLimit`: optional failed-auth limiter. Applies per client IP and per auth scope (shared-secret and device-token are tracked independently). Blocked attempts return `429` + `Retry-After`.
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- `auth.rateLimit.exemptLoopback` defaults to `true`; set `false` when you intentionally want localhost traffic rate-limited too (for test setups or strict proxy deployments).
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- Browser-origin WS auth attempts are always throttled with loopback exemption disabled (defense-in-depth against browser-based localhost brute force).
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- `tailscale.mode`: `serve` (tailnet only, loopback bind) or `funnel` (public, requires auth).
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- `controlUi.allowedOrigins`: explicit browser-origin allowlist for Control UI/WebChat WebSocket connects. Required when Control UI is reachable on non-loopback binds.
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- `controlUi.allowedOrigins`: explicit browser-origin allowlist for Gateway WebSocket connects. Required when browser clients are expected from non-loopback origins.
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- `controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback`: dangerous mode that enables Host-header origin fallback for deployments that intentionally rely on Host-header origin policy.
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- `remote.transport`: `ssh` (default) or `direct` (ws/wss). For `direct`, `remote.url` must be `ws://` or `wss://`.
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- `gateway.remote.token` is for remote CLI calls only; does not enable local gateway auth.
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