diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index d8c53f815bd..8db76d22302 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/Config writes: block reserved prototype keys in account-id normalization and route account config resolution through own-key lookups, hardening `/allowlist` and account-scoped config paths against prototype-chain pollution.
 - Security/Exec: harden `safeBins` long-option validation by rejecting unknown/ambiguous GNU long-option abbreviations and denying sort filesystem-dependent flags (`--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`), closing safe-bin denylist bypasses. Thanks @jiseoung.
 - Security/Channels: unify dangerous name-matching policy checks (`dangerouslyAllowNameMatching`) across core and extension channels, share mutable-allowlist detectors between `openclaw doctor` and `openclaw security audit`, and scan all configured accounts (not only the default account) in channel security audit findings.
-- Security/Exec approvals: enforce canonical wrapper execution plans across allowlist analysis and runtime execution (node host + gateway host), fail closed on semantic `env` wrapper usage, and reject unknown short safe-bin flags to prevent `env -S/--split-string` interpretation-mismatch bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
+- Security/Exec approvals: enforce canonical wrapper execution plans across allowlist analysis and runtime execution (node host + gateway host), fail closed on semantic `env` wrapper usage, and reject unknown short safe-bin flags to prevent `env -S/--split-string` interpretation-mismatch bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Image tool: enforce `tools.fs.workspaceOnly` for sandboxed `image` path resolution so mounted out-of-workspace paths are blocked before media bytes are loaded/sent to vision providers. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 
 ## 2026.2.23 (Unreleased)
diff --git a/src/browser/server.agent-contract-snapshot-endpoints.test.ts b/src/browser/server.agent-contract-snapshot-endpoints.test.ts
index 8c411e08775..8fddcccc0b8 100644
--- a/src/browser/server.agent-contract-snapshot-endpoints.test.ts
+++ b/src/browser/server.agent-contract-snapshot-endpoints.test.ts
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ describe("browser control server", () => {
       cdpUrl: state.cdpBaseUrl,
       targetId: "abcd1234",
       url: "https://example.com",
+      ssrfPolicy: {
+        dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork: true,
+      },
     });
 
     const click = await postJson<{ ok: boolean }>(`${base}/act`, {
diff --git a/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts b/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts
index 60337d2c098..2e7702714be 100644
--- a/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts
+++ b/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts
@@ -254,6 +254,35 @@ describe("exec approvals command resolution", () => {
     expect(resolution?.rawExecutable).toBe("/usr/bin/env");
   });
 
+  it("fails closed for env -S even when env itself is allowlisted", () => {
+    const dir = makeTempDir();
+    const binDir = path.join(dir, "bin");
+    fs.mkdirSync(binDir, { recursive: true });
+    const envName = process.platform === "win32" ? "env.exe" : "env";
+    const envPath = path.join(binDir, envName);
+    fs.writeFileSync(envPath, process.platform === "win32" ? "" : "#!/bin/sh\n");
+    if (process.platform !== "win32") {
+      fs.chmodSync(envPath, 0o755);
+    }
+
+    const analysis = analyzeArgvCommand({
+      argv: [envPath, "-S", 'sh -c "echo pwned"'],
+      cwd: dir,
+      env: makePathEnv(binDir),
+    });
+    const allowlistEval = evaluateExecAllowlist({
+      analysis,
+      allowlist: [{ pattern: envPath }],
+      safeBins: normalizeSafeBins([]),
+      cwd: dir,
+    });
+
+    expect(analysis.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(analysis.segments[0]?.resolution?.policyBlocked).toBe(true);
+    expect(allowlistEval.allowlistSatisfied).toBe(false);
+    expect(allowlistEval.segmentSatisfiedBy).toEqual([null]);
+  });
+
   it("unwraps env wrapper with shell inner executable", () => {
     const resolution = resolveCommandResolutionFromArgv(["/usr/bin/env", "bash", "-lc", "echo hi"]);
     expect(resolution?.rawExecutable).toBe("bash");
diff --git a/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts b/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts
index dace3aeffeb..bffe6c638ba 100644
--- a/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts
+++ b/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts
@@ -150,7 +150,6 @@ describe("handleSystemRunInvoke mac app exec host routing", () => {
       }),
     );
   });
-
   it("denies ./sh wrapper spoof in allowlist on-miss mode before execution", async () => {
     const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-wrapper-spoof-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
     const runCommand = vi.fn(async () => {
@@ -213,4 +212,21 @@ describe("handleSystemRunInvoke mac app exec host routing", () => {
       // no-op
     }
   });
+
+  it("denies env -S shell payloads in allowlist mode", async () => {
+    const { runCommand, sendInvokeResult } = await runSystemInvoke({
+      preferMacAppExecHost: false,
+      security: "allowlist",
+      command: ["env", "-S", 'sh -c "echo pwned"'],
+    });
+    expect(runCommand).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(sendInvokeResult).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        ok: false,
+        error: expect.objectContaining({
+          message: expect.stringContaining("allowlist miss"),
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
 });